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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.
3
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.'
ADMIRALTY.
Jurisdiction.-Where a damage done is done wholly upon land, the
fact that the cause of the damage originated on water subject to the
admiralty jurisdiction does not make the cause one for the admiralty:
The Plymouth, 3 Wall.
Hence, where a vessel lying at a wharf, on waters subject to admiralty
jurisdiction, took fire, and the fire, spreading itself to certain.storehouses
on the wharf, consumed these and their stores, it was held not to be a
case for admiralty proceeding: Id.
ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
Establishment of Fraud.-Where an assignment, made by an insol-
vent debtor, in trust for the benefit of creditors, contains provisions
which are calculated, per se, to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, the
fraud must be passed upon as a question of fact: Kavanagh v. Beck-
with, 44 Barb.
But if the necessary consequence of a conceded transaction is the de-
frauding of another, the transaction itself is conclusive evidence of a
fraudulent intent, inasmuch as a party must be presumed to have in-
tended the necessary consequences of his own act. And if, in such a
case, against such evidence, a jury or referee should find that there was
no fraud, it would become the duty of the court to set aside the finding:
Id.
And where an assignment on its face shows that it must necessarily
have the effect of defrauding the creditors of the assignor, it is conclu-
sive evidence of a fraudulent intent, and is void: -d.
The same rule should prevail in cases where extrinsie facts and cir-
cumstances, admitted by the parties, or established by the evidence
without dispute or explanation, make the assignment necessarily fraudu-
lent, according to the law of the case: -d.
An overstatement of the amount of certain preferred debts will not
render an assignment necessarily fraudulent. The assigneeg are not
boud to pay the debts at the amounts therein specified: Id.
I To appear in vol. 3 of Wallace's Reports.
2 From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 10 of his Reports.
s From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 44 of his Reports.
' From W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 37 Vermont Reports.
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They are bound to pay the debts at their just amounts, and nothing
more. They may require proof as to the amounts, and it is their duty
to do so, if they have reason to believe the amounts are not correctly
stated in the assignment: Id.
The fact that at the time when an assignment was executed, the
assignor did not know the precise amount of his debts, for the reason
that his books had not been posted in three months, is a circumstance
tending to disprove a fraudulent intent in overstating the amount of the
debts, in the assignment: 
Id.
And so in respect to the circumstance that the assignor was advised
by his counsel, in regard to one of his debts, that it would answer to
state its amount as nearly as he could in the assignment, leaving it to be
adjusted when the books were written up: Id.
ASSOCIATIONS.
Dissolution by non-user of .Functions.-" The Mount Lebanon Royal
Arch Chapter" of Free Masons, in 1836, disposed of all their real and
personal property, consisting of their hall, furniture, and equipment,
pursuant to a vote of the chapter, and for twenty-three years held no
meetings, elected no officers, performed no acts required by its laws and
rules, and ceased to have any visible sign of existence. Held, that the
legal existence of the chapter was gone, and that it was beyond the
power of the State Chapter to restore it to life so as to preserve for it a
continued existence from 1836: Stricldand et al. v. Prichard et al.,
37 Vt.
A rule of the association that officers elected should hold their office,
till others were elected, could not operate in a cage of this kind to pre-
serve its legal existence: Id.
ATTORNEY.
Retaining Fee.-A retainer to defend a suit does not extend to the
employment of the attorney to defend a second suit brought upon the
recognisance entered in the first suit: Smith v. Dougherty, 37 Vt.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Transmission for Collection-Rights of Receiving Bank as Holder.-
On the 29th of May 1861, the plaintiff being the owner of a promissory
note made by W., payable in the city of New York, and to mature on
the 1st and 4th of June, he deposited the same for collection, in the M.
Bank, indorsed in blank. The M. Bank was then indebted to the de-
fendant, its agent in the city of New York, for over-drafts, in a sum
exceeding the amount of the note. The M. Bank forwarded the note
to the defendant, with directions to collect the same, and credit the M.
Bank with the proceeds. The note was collected, and the proceeds
credited by the defendant to the account of the M. Bank, but the de-
fendant had no notice or knowledge that the note belonged to the
plaintiff. The M. Bank failed on the 4th of June. Reld, that the de-
fendant could not be regarded as a purchaser or holder for value of the
note, or of its proceeds, according to the rule prevailing in New York,
so as to exclude the claims of the plaintiff, who was the real owner:
West v The American Exchange Bank, 44 Barb.
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Held, also, that the facts that the defendant held the note as collateral
security for the payment of any balance of account that might be owing
by the M. Bank; that the M. Bank was largely indebted to the defend-
ant before the note was received by the latter; and that the defendant
credited said debtor, in account, with the proceeds of the note, when
collected;-did not of themselves constitute a valuable consideration,
within the rule referred to, notwithstanding the defendant so credited
the proceeds in good faith, in the ordinary course of business, and with-
out notice of the plaintiff's title: Id.
Action against Administrator- Cnsideraton.-If an administrator
has in his possession a note due from his intestate and refuses to pay it
or deliver it to the owner, an action at law may be maintained upon it,
to recover the amount from the assets of the estate of the intestate:
Prescott v. Ward, 10 Allen.
Delay by a man to fulfil a promise to marry, and services rendered to
him by the woman during the continuance of the engagement, in pro-
curing and taking care of his clothing, are a sufficient consideration for
a promissory note given by him to her; and the fact that other motives
entered into his mind and induced him to give it is immaterial: Id.
Trover.-The plaintiff gave the note in question for accommodation
to the defendant, who was to pay and take care of it, and save the de-
fendant from liability upon it. The defendant paid and took up the
note after having used it for the purpose designed, and then claimed to
hold it as a valid instrument still in force against the plaintiff, and re-
fused to give it up on demand. Held, that in the character thus assumed
for the note by the defendant, the plaintiff had a right to it and might
maintain trover for it: Park v. .cDaniels, 37 Vt.
BOND OF INDEMNITY.
A bond to a constable, conditioned to keep him harmless and irdem-
nified of, from, and against all damages, costs, charges, trouble, and
expense that he may be put to, sustain, or suffer, by reason of a levy
upon and sale of property on execution, is broken and an action may be
maintained upon it, as soon as a liability is incurred by the officer in
consequence of such levy and sale: Bancroft v. Winspear, 44 Barb.
The obligee is not bound first to advance his own money, to discharge
a liability, before he can seek indemnity by an action upon the bond:
Id.
In an action brought upon such a bond, the plaintiff may recover not
only the amount he has actually expended in the defence of an action
brought against him by one claiming to be the owner of the property
levied on, but the costs and counsel fees of his attorney and counsel in
defending such suit, although the latter have not been actually paid by
the obligee: Id.
CONTRACT.
By Married Woman to give up control of Children.-If a married
woman who has been compelled to live separate from her husband by
reason of his intemperance and crime is unable to provide for her child-
ren, and thereupon voluntarily gites them up to a charitable institution
established for the purpose of furnishing homes to destitute children,
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under a written contract by which the children are to be placed out or
adopted in a good family, and she is not to seek to discover them or
deprive such family of them, the contract is valid; but this court, on a
habeas corpus afterwards brought by the parents to recover their child-
ren, will inquire whether the welfare of the children is properly attended
to, and in so doing will not be restricted to the ordinary modes of trial,
nor require the children to be brought into open court, or their residence
disclosed to their parents: Dumain and Wife v. Gwnne, 10 Allen.
Time of Perforrmance.-A written contract for the purchase and sale
of land within ten days is to be performed within ten days from its date,
and not from its delivery, unless so much time has passed before the
delivery as to make the performance within that time impossible or
unreasonable: Goldsmith v. Guild, 10 Allen.
The doctrine that time is not of the essence of a contract in equity
should not be applied, as a general rule, to a sale of land in this
country: Id.
Damages.-If a written contract by which the master of a whaling-
ship is employed provides that he shall have a certain "lay" on the pro-
ceeds and also an, additional compensation depending upon the amount
of the cargo, and lie is wrongfully discharged by the owners before the
expiration of the contract, he may recover, as a part of his damages, his
share of the earnings of the ship both before and after his removal:
Dennis v. Maxfield et al., 10 Allen.
A party cannot except to an erroneous instruction which is given to
the jury at his request: Id.
CORPORATION.
Seal-A fac-simile of the seal of a corporation printed upon blank
forms 'of obligations prepared to be executed by the corporation at the
same time when the blank is printed and by the same agency, is not a
seal, It common law, nor will such forms, when executed by the corpo-
ration, be contracts under seal, although the language of them calls for
a seal: Bates v. Boston and New York Central Railroad Co., 10 Allen.
COUNTY OFrmc'x.
Subscriptions by Counties to Railroads.-A county "1 officer" is one
by whom the county performs its usual political functions or offices of
government; who exercises continuously, and as a part of the regular
and permanent administration of government, its public powers, trusts,
or duties. A fixed number of persons, specially and by name appointed
by t he Legislature to act as a board of commissioners, in a matter about
which, though relating, immediately to the county, county officers, in
the exercise of their general powers as such, and without special autho-
rity from the Legislature, have not authority to act, are not county
"officers :" Sheboygan County v. Parker, 3 Wall.
Hence, when special authority was given by the Legislature to the
people of a county, to say whether or not they would subscribe to a rail-
road and bind themselves to pay for it, that body, in giving the autho-
rity, may properly direct the mode in which such subscription shall be
made and paid for;-may, ex. gr., appoint special persons to make the
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subscription, and to issue bonds in behalf of the county therefor-even
though the constitution of the state in which the county is provides that
"t all county officers shall be elected by the electors of the county," and
though there may be a regular board of county supervisors elected
accordingly, then administering the ordinary county affairs. Bonds so
executed and issued bind the county: Id.
Note.-In this case, the statute enacted that any bonds issued under
its provisions should be " of full and complete evidence both in law and
equity to establish the indebtedness of the county :" Id.
CUSTOm DUTIES.
Onus Probandi in Revenue Cases-" Kvowingtl," entering Goods-
Prices- Current .- The provision in the Revenue Act of March 3d 1863-
that when foreign goods brought or sent into the United States are ob-
tained otherwise than by purchase, they shall be invoiced at the "1actual
market value thereof at the time and place when and where the same
were procured or manufactured"-does not mean any locality more
limited than the countrhy where the goods are bought or manufactured.
The standard to be applied is the principal markets in that country.
Hence proof of the market value in Paris of wines made at Rheims, a
hundred and more miles off, may be given; there being no other evi-
dence on the subject: Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall.
The provisions in the 70th and 71st sections of the Revenue Act of
1799, by which, when a probable cause of forfeiture is made out to the
satisfaction of the judge trying the case, the onus of proving innocence
is thrown upon the claimant, apply to the Act of 3d March 1863, though
not in terms adopted by it; neither of the said sections having been ever
repealed, and this rule of onus probandi having been always regarded as
a permanent feature of our revenue system: Id.
The expression in the Act of'3d March 1863, "If any owner, con-
signee, or agent shall knowingly make an entry of goods, &c., by means
of any false invoice, certificate, or by means of any other false or fraudu-
lent document," &c., means if such person shall make such entry, &c.,
of goods knowing that the invoice, &c., does not express their actual
market value-swearing falsely and knowing it,-and the expression as
used in the act refers to the guilty knowledge on the part of either the
owner, consignee, or agent; the act of an agent or consignee being the
act of the guilty principal: Id.
Prices-current obtained from the agent of a manufacturer or from
dealers in the manufactured articles generally, and which have been
prepared and used by the parties furnishing them in the ordinary course
of their business, are so far evidence of the value of the articles men-
tioned in them as that they may be submitted to the jury as "throwing
light" on the matter; as "some guides to candid men," and for their
" consideration." And this rule was held to apply so far as that the
comparative value, at the town of manufacture (Rheims) and at the
capital of the country (Paris), of champagne wines made by one manu-
facturer (Cliquot), was allowed to be shown by the prices-current giving
the value of that made by others (Mumm, Moet & Chandon); it not
appearing-either by evidence in the case set forth in the bill of excep-
tions, or by an admission of the judge upon the bill, that such evidence
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was given-but that the articles were the same in price, kind, and
quality: Id.
Whether there is sufficient proof of agency to warrant the admission
of the acts and declarations of the agent in evidence, is a preliminary
question for the court: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Rights of Creditor who has attached Land to redeem prior Incum-
brances.-An attachment upon land creates a specific lien thereon, and
vests in the attaching-creditor a right in equity to redeem the land,
even before judgment and levy, from a prior incumbrance, in order to
make his own claim beneficial or available to himself: Chandler v.
Dycr, 87 Vt.
He is entitled to the same right of redemption as a mortgageg has;
and if not joined as a party in a suit of foreclosure upon the same land,
his right to redeem is not affected by the decree: Id.
His payment of the prior mortgage-incumbrance is not regarded as a
voluntary payment, but the exercise of an equitable right, and, as
against the mortgagor and all holding under him and subsequent to his,
the creditor's, attachment, the effect of the redemption is not to extin-
guish the mortgage so redeemed, but to keep it alive as a subsisting
lien upon the land, whether the creditor pursue his attachment-lien or
not: .d.
DEED.
Setting aside for Fraud.--LOne who has the superior legal title, by
deed from the purchaser at a mortgage-sale, and who is in possession, no
attempt having been made to disturb him, cannot maintain an action to
set aside a deed executed by the mortgagee, and to have the same
declared void, on the ground that the grantor was induced to execute
it by fraud on the part of the grantee: Butler v. Vile, 44 Barb.
EASEMENT.
Conveyance of adjoining Estates by same Owner.-If the owner of two
adjoining estates, through one of which a drain exists for the benefit of
the other, conveys them both 6n the same day to different purchasers,
the right to use the drain will not pass as an easement or appurtenance
to the purchaser of the upper estate, provided a new drain can be built
upon his own land by reasonable labor and expense: Randal v.
McLaughlin, 10 Allen.
EXEOTMENT.
Duty of Officer serving Writ of Possession.-It is not the duty of an
%officer who serves a writ of possession to expel from the premises any
persons who were in possession, claiming title in themselves, at the time
when the suit was commenced in which the writ issued, and who do not
claim under the person against whom that writ runs, nor resist the officer
in his attempt to remove the latter and those claiming under him: Clark
v. Parkinson and Another, 10 Allen.
ESTOPPEL.
Parol Settlement of.Boundary Line.-Where a boundary line is
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fixed and settled by parol agreement between A. and B., adjoining
owners, and B. afterwards, with the knowledge of A., makes valuable
and expensive improvements, relying upon such settlement, without any
objection or remonstrance or notice of dissent from A., in regard to the
line thus established, the latter is estopped from claiming that such was
not the true boundary line between their respective lots: Corkh ill v.
Sanders, 44 Barb.
To permit A., after the improvements are completed, to raise the
objection and dispossess B., on. the ground that the line was not in fact
the true line, would be allowing him to take advantage of his own cul-
pable neglect, to the great injury of B. Hence the principle of equita-
ble estoppel applies: Id.
The rule applies equally to transactions in regard to real and personal
property. It does not at all touch the question of creating title to real
estate by parol : Id.
A defence of that kind, may be set up in the action of ejectment:
Id.
EVIDENCE.
Church Record.-The entry of a baptism, contemporaneously made
by a Roman Catholic priest, in the discharge of his ecclesiastical duty,
in his church record of baptisms, is competent evidence, after his death,
of the date of the baptism, if the book is produced from the proper cus-
tody; although he was not a sworn officer, and the record was not
required by law to be kept: Kennedy v. Doyle, 10 Allen.
EXECUTOR.
Recovery of Debt owed by the Estate.-One who has been an executor
of an estate and resigned his trust cannot maintain a suit either at law
- or in equity against the administrator with the will annexed, to recover
a debt due to him from the estate. His remedy is in the settlement of
the accounts of administration in the probate court: Prentice v. Dezhon
et aL, 10 Allen.
FORWARDING.
Obtigation of iShipper to know Customs of the Forwarding Business--
.ow far bound to use Tdegraph.-Where a bill of lading, signed by a
master, shows that a voyage to a particular place named on it is but part
of a longer transit, which it is understood is to be made by the cargo
shipped, and that the cargo is to be carried forward in a continuous way
on its further voyage, the master must be presumed to have contracted
in reference to the course of trade connected with getting the cargo for-
ward: The Convoy's Wheat, 3 Wall.
In such a case, if any obstacle should intervene, which by the regular
course of the trade is liable to occur and for a short time retard the for-
warding, the master cannot from a mere inability to find storage at the
entrep~t, turn about, and taking the cargo to some near port, store it
there, inform the consignees, and clear out. He should wait: Id.
If there is easy telegraphic communication with the consignees, he
should notify to them his difficulty, that they may send him, if they
please, instructions: Id.
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FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Part Performance.-Previous to the purchase of mortgaged premises
by C. at a foreclosure sale, it was agreed by parol, between him and M.,
that M. should have the premises conveyed to him, upon payment to C.
of the amount of his bid, with interest and costs. M. was then in pos-
session of a portion of the premises under a contract to purchase from
a former owner. After 0. had purchased, the parol agreement was
renewed or reaffirmed, by parol, and C. gave up to M. the possession of
the residue of the premises, and authorized him to keep possession and
rent the same. M. accordingly rented a portion of the preniises to a
tenant, and made payments according to his parol agreement, amounting
to more than one-third of the purchase-money, which C. accepted and
received. Held, that such possession and part payment took the parol
agreement out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds; and that the
agreement could have been enforced specifically against C. : .fHeritlew v.
Andrews, 44 Barb.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Ante-nuptial Contrac.-An ante-nuptial contract by which a woman
agrees to relinquish her distributive share of her intended husband's
estate will be enforced in equity, if entered into understandingly, for an
adequate consideration, and without fraud or misrepresentation on his
part: Tarbell v. Tarbell, 10 Allen.
Evidence of Marriage and Legitimacy.-Though on a question of
marriage and legitimacy, it is competent, in order to prove an heirship
asserted, to give in evidence the declarations of any deceased member
of that family to which the person from whom the estate descends
belonged, yet it is not competent to give the declarations of a person
belonging to another family,-such person being connected with the -
person from whom the estate descends only by an asserted intermarriage
of a member of each family: Blackburn v. Orawfords, 3 Wall.
Independently of statute requiring it to be kept, a baptismal register
of a church, in which entries of baptism are mad6 in the ordinary course
of the clergyman's business, is admissible to prove the fact and date of
baptism, but not to prove other facts, as, ex. gr., that the child was bap-
tized as the lawful child of the parents, and hence to infer a marriage
between them: -d.
Where there has been no official registry-of marriages kept in the
church where a clergyman ministered, a private memorandum in which
the minister, in the ordinary course of his business, has entered or
intended to enter, as it occurred, each marriage celebrated by him, is
admissible on a question whether such minister ever did or did not cele-
brate a particular marriage in question : Id.
But the memorandum ought itself to be produced; and if the testi-
mony of the minisler proving the memorandum is taken by commission,
the memorandum ought itself to be annexed to the deposition; or-if the
deposition is taken in a foreign country and the possessor of the memo-
randum be unwilling to part with the original-a proved copy: Id.
However, if neither the orignal nor such copy has been annexed, the
objection to the want of such original or copy should be taken in some
form (such as motion to suppress) before the trial. If made first on the
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trial it is too late: YTork Co. v. Central Railroad, 2 Wall. 107, on this
point, affirmed: Id.
On a question whether a particular priest of the Roman Church ever
celebrated a marriage at a particular church betwean parties who had
been previously living in fornication, hia.statement that no official regis-
try of marriages was kept, but that he kept a private memorandum for
himself (producing and annexing it as above specified), and that the
alleged marriage did not appear in it; that he was aware the law imposed
a penalty for performing the ceremony without a license; that he never
married parties without a license; that he always required the presence
of two witnesses; and that he never celebrated a secret marriage between
parties living in sin, one or both of whom would only be married on the
condition that such marriage was to be kept secret-is admissible: .d.
On a question of marriage and legitimacy, an attorney, who drew a
will for the alleged husband now deceased, in which the children of the
connection set up as wedlock are described as the "natural children" of
the testator, may, without violating professional confidence, testify what
was said by the testator about the character of the children and his rela-
tions to their mother, in interviews between the testator and himself
preceding and connected with the preparation of the will: Id.
It is error to instruct a jury that if a man and woman live together
as husband and wife, and the man acknowledge the woman as his wife,
and always treat her as such, and acknowledge and treat the children
which she bore him as his children, and permit them to be called by
his name,-then that the presumption of law is in favor of their legiti-
macy. The question of legitimacy, under such circumstances, is a
question for the jury; the law making no presumptions about it: Id.
INFANT.
RatIfcation of Promise made during Minoriy.-A promise by a
minor to pay money borrowed on joint account with another person,
may be ratified by the minor after coming of age, like other voidable
promises: Kennedy v. Doyle, 10 Allen.
INSURANCE.
By Owner of Eguity of Redemtion.-If the owner of the equity
of redemption of land procures a policy of insurance upon the buildings
standing thereon, at his own expense, payable to the mortgagee in case
of loss, and the policy contains a written provision that no sale of the
property shall affect the right of the mortgagee to recover in case of loss
under the policy, and the equity of redemption is afterwards sold, and a
loss occurs, and the insurance company upon paying the amount thereof
to the mortgagee take from him an assignment of the mortgage and
policy, the purchaser of the equity of redemption is %ntitled to the bene-
fit of the money so paid by the insurance company, and may redeem the
land upon paying to the insurance company the balance due upon the
mortgage-debt afterdeducting that amount: Graves v. Rampden Fire
Insurance Co., 10 Allen.
Damuges for partial Loss-Construction of Policy.-If a partial loss
occurs upon a policy, for a sum expressed in dollars, made here, upon
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property situated in a foreign country, the rule for estimating damages is
to determine the loss at the place where it occurred, in the currency of
that country, and then to find the equivalent in the country where suit
is brought, by determining the actual intrinsic value of the currency of
that country, as compared with the currency of the other; and it .is
immaterial, in reference to this, that the policy contains a provision that
in case of loss the company shall have the right to replace the articles
' lost or damaged with others of the same kind and equal goodness: Bur-
gess et al. v. Alliance Insurance Co., 10 Allen.
An open policy of insurance upon merchandise will not cover articles
kept wholly or partially for use in and about a building, but only articles
kept for sale; but an open policy upon "property" contained in "speci -
fied" buildings, will cover articles kept for use as well as those kept for
sale: Id.
PLEADING.
Charging Fraud.-The burden of charging, as well as proving fraud,
is on the party alleging it ; and while it is not necessary or proper that
he should spread out, in his pleading, the evidence on which he relies,
he must aver, fully and explicitly, the facts consttuttig the alleged
fraud. Mere conclusions will not avail: Butler v. Viele, 44 Barb.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Title of Purchaser under Foreclosure Sale.-One who purchases mort.
gaged premises from the purchaser at a foreclosure sale acquires, by his
deed, the title which the mortgagor had before giving the mortgage:
Butler v. Wiele, 44 Barb.
Where one purchases with actual notice of a prior unregistered mort-
gage upon the premises, the registry of his deed will be of no avail,
against such notice: Id.
Purchaser bound to take notice of Rights of Party in Possesson.-
Where one is in possession of premises, and exercising acts of ownership,
a party coming to purchase is bound to take notice of his rights, whatever
they may be; and the law will oblige him, if he takes the premises at all,
to take them subject to those rights: Merithew v. Andrews, 44 Barb.
A purchaser of land, having actual or constructive notice of the equi-
table rights of a third party, under a contract with the immediate vendor
of such purchaser, is bound to respect those rights, and may be decreed
to perform the contract on the part of his vendor, upon the performance,
or tender of performance, thereof by such third party: Id.
WITNESS.
Privilege not to Answer-liference from Refusal.-Assuming that a
witness is privileged from answering a question addressed to him as a
witness on the par) of the plaintiff, the mere conjecture that his refusal
to answer, followed by a decision of the justice that he is not bound to do
so, or his refusal, followed by a ruling that he is privileged, may have
created an impression in the minds of the jury that his testimony, if
given, would have tended to make out the plaintiff's case, should not be
entertained, as the basis of reversing a judgment which is in all respects,
apparently, free from error: Murphy v. Tripp, 44 Barb.
